Psychosocial Aspects of Korean Reunification: Explicit and Implicit National Attitudes and Identity of South Koreans and North Korean Defectors

Article in Peace and Conflict Journal of Peace Psychology · September 2001
DOI: 10.1207/S15327949PAC0703b_5

2 authors, including:

Do-Yeong Kim
Ajou University
32 PUBLICATIONS 782 CITATIONS

Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects:

- Basic and Applied Psychology View project
- Implicit Social Cognition View project
Two studies investigated the explicit and implicit attitudes toward, and identification with, South and North Korea by a sample of South Koreans and North Koreans who voluntarily defected to the South. North Korean defectors showed (a) more positive evaluations of South Korea on explicit self-report measures, but more favorable evaluations of the North on an implicit measure, and (b) on average, North–South neutral identity on an explicit measure, but stronger self-association with the North on an implicit measure. In contrast, South Koreans indicated consistently positive attitudes toward, and identification with, the South on both explicit and implicit measures. Implications of these findings for Korean unification are discussed.

Korean unification could be something like the catastrophic crack of the earth’s two plates. It could be a division and disruption rather than a union. … it could be a pain where it pretends to be a joy, a division rather than a unity.

Y.-G. Kim

For about half a century, “Our Wish, Unification of Korea” has consistently ranked as the favorite song of both South and North Koreans alike, regardless of age and

Requests for reprints should be sent to Do-Yeong Kim at the Department of Psychology, The University of Illinois, 603 East Daniel Street, Champaign, IL 61820. E-mail: kimd@uiuc.edu
gender. The overwhelming popularity of the song indicates the enormous interest in and the wishes of both peoples, North and South, for the ideal of Korean unity.

Koreans have historically regarded themselves as a racially and culturally homogeneous population and a unified nation. Over the past 50 years, however, since the Korean War, the two Koreas have been marked by radically divergent social, political, ideological, and economic systems. Whereas the South has fully embraced the ideals of a liberal democratic society with a market economy, the North has pursued an autocratic system of socialism, tightly controlled first by the all-powerful leader Kim, Il-Sung, followed by his son, Kim, Jung-II, who have been practically worshiped as God-like leaders.

Despite the end of the Cold War era, symbolized most prominently, perhaps, by German unification, Korea remains a divided nation in a technical state of war. Both South and North Korea currently spend a very significant amount of their national revenues on military expenses to defend themselves against what they perceive to be the threat represented by their “brothers and sisters” on the other side of the 38th parallel.

PSYCHOSOCIAL ISSUES SURROUNDING THE UNIFICATION OF KOREA

Although unification holds great allure for the Korean people—North and South—many people argue that there could well be more challenges than solutions that Koreans would have to face if it were to take place (Grinker, 1998; Lee, 1994; Oh, 1996). The hope for unification represents an opportunity for Koreans to celebrate a reunion that has only been a dream for the past half-century—based on the faith that a reunified Korea would be more prosperous, at least in time, than a divided Korea. It is important to ask, however, whether Koreans would be able to maintain such a positive view in the face of the sacrifices and tolerance that would be necessary to deal with the potential political and economic problems that would undoubtedly accompany unification. Do both North and South Koreans know enough about one another to understand and accept their differences, in the face of the numerous trials and hardships?

Sung (1995) argued for recognition of the importance of psychosocial processes that the two Koreas will undergo when people who have lived in two different social and political systems are joined into one nation. In her view, such a process could force people to act or think against their beliefs based on ideologies and thoughts that have been experienced as a norm for more than 50 years.

Although different from the Korean context in several important ways, similar concerns appeared in the psychosocial conflicts that characterized German society immediately preceding and following unification of East and West. Surveys conducted following the unification of Germany reported strong negative stereotypes
and prejudice based on the antagonism between West and East Germans that
developed throughout the era of the Cold War (Ann, 1991).

Even presently, for example, Wessi and Ossi (Westerner and Easterner) are terms
used to represent West Germans and East Germans that have only come into wide-
spread use following reunification and have come to symbolize the internal divi-
sions that continue on a psychological level (Mikels, 2000). Closely associated with
these two categories are certain (negative) stereotypes: Stereotypical West Germans
(Wessi) are thought to be arrogant, preoccupied with money, focused selfishly on
themselves and their careers, and highly competitive people, who try to take advan-
tage of East Germans if given the opportunity. Whereas, the stereotypical East Ger-
man is lazy, shows no initiative and is inclined to follow fascist or xenophobic
ideologies that present simple solutions. More than 10 years after reunification those
categories are still present even amongst younger Germans—there is a saying that
the former wall still exists in the mind of the Germans.

Examples from Koreans in China, Former Soviet Union,
and North Korean Defectors

Since the Cold War has become history, South Koreans have observed the flow of
fellow Koreans returning from China and Russia where they had lived in exile dur-
ing and after the Japanese colonization. Many of those fellow-Koreans returned to
South Korea with great hope and enthusiasm. However, their hopes and expecta-
tions have been greatly challenged by difficulty in adjusting to a lifestyle based on a
new cultural, political, and capitalistic economic system, as well as a lack of under-
standing and prejudice from South Koreans. Many of them finally returned to their
original place of exile despite the fact that they had once survived there only for the
hope of going back to their home country.

The North Koreans who defected to and are presently living in South Korea tell
us far more about the potential difficulty and complexity of unification. As of July
1998, the number of Korean defectors to the South totaled 914. In a recent survey
conducted by the Unification Ministry, North Korean defectors reported great dif-

culties with everyday life, especially communicating with South Koreans, find-
ing and keeping jobs, and finding marriage partners (Lee, 1997; Oh, 1996). In
addition to being socially isolated, they feel they are being discriminated against.
Some believe that they are treated worse than foreign guest workers. Many are dis-

tressed by what they perceive to be a general South Korean view that nothing in the
North is worth knowing (Grinker, 1998).

These examples suggest that ignoring and neglecting a psychological under-
standing of the two Koreans could be a great mistake for the ultimate unification
that Koreans desire. Nonetheless, most discussions and research on Korean unifi-
cation for the last 50 years has exclusively focused on structural unification, pre-
dominantly emphasizing it in the context of politics and economy. Any existing review of socio-cultural and psychological aspects of Korean unification is currently destined to be incomplete simply due to the dearth of systematic research carried out in this area. The very few published reports are of the nature of impressionistic discussions rather than empirical studies. Although these reports are useful for drawing attention to various qualitative aspects of potential conflicts after Korean unification, they cannot take the place of reliable empirical research.

This lack of empirical findings is largely due to two major limitations that have hindered active research activities and progress. A first and major limitation of scientific research progress is in methodology. Most methods used in the research have predominantly been based on questionnaires and intensive interviews of very small groups of four or fewer North Korean defectors. However, such methods make the validity of the results questionable because of the potential for socially desirable responses and impression management on self-report questionnaires (particularly those in the attitude domain) and the reliance on the interviewer’s subjective interpretations (Helmes & Holden, 1986; Rosenberg, 1969; Sigall & Page, 1971; Weber & Cook, 1972). Another significant obstacle for research progress has been difficulty in accessing members of the North Korean population. North Korea’s complete isolation from South Korea and other parts of the world as well as a legal restriction on South Korean visits to the North have made it impossible to conduct a comparative study of North and South Koreans. Most scholarly works so far have been conducted in the light of South Koreans’ representations of the differences between the South and the North. However, the results cannot determine what differences between the North and the South really are, but only what those differences are as articulated in the representations found in the South.

PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY

This research was designed to overcome these two primary limitations and to enable the investigation of social psychological issues of national attitude and self-identity of South Koreans and North Korean defectors. Particularly, this study expects to overcome potential problems concerning the social desirability effect from the use of North Korean defectors (instead of North Koreans presently living in the North) by utilizing indirect measures to assess the implicit level of national attitude and identity of South Koreans and North Korean defectors (Kim, 2000).

This study also provides us an opportunity to examine the cross-cultural/ecological validity of implicit (non-conscious) cognition dissociated from explicit (conscious) cognition. Most research on implicit and explicit cognition has been conducted predominantly in the domain of prejudicial racial attitudes, such as White versus Black in the United States, which are rooted in racial group conflict (Dovidio, Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson, & Howard, 1997; Greenwald, McGhee,
Little empirical research has investigated the issue in a cross-cultural context where prejudicial attitudes have been developed by 50 years of political and ideological antagonism within a racially and ethnically homogeneous population that formerly constituted one nation.

Overview: Implicit Social Cognition

For the last decade, researchers on implicit social cognition have emphasized the importance of distinguishing between explicit and implicit measures of psychological characteristics (e.g., Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Schacter, 1990; Wegner & Bargh, 1998). Explicit measures of attitudes operate in a conscious mode and are exemplified by traditional self-report measures. In contrast, implicit attitudes operate in an unconscious fashion and represent “introspectively unidentified (or inaccurately identified) traces of past experience that mediate favorable or unfavorable feeling, thought, or action toward social objects” (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995, p. 8).

Research using implicit measures suggests that subtle and implicit forms of prejudicial attitudes are present but often are not detected by explicit attitude measures (Crosby, Bromley, & Saxe, 1980; Fiske, 1998). For example, Gaertner and McLaughlin (1983) reported in their study, using a latency-based (implicit) cognitive measure, that when they primed both the word White and the word Black with positive meaning words, White participants responded faster to White than to Black. Participants also responded faster when negative attributes were paired with Black than when positive attributes were paired with Black. In addition, the study showed that participants who appeared to be aware of the general purpose of the study (i.e., something about prejudice) did not control their responses to stimulus pairs containing Black. Another latency-based indirect priming measure of race stereotyping can be found in the study of Dovidio, Evans, and Tyler (1986) in which participants were asked to perform a simple judgment about a target trait. In comparing Whites to Blacks, the Dovidio et al. study showed that positive traits were more strongly associated with Whites and negative characteristics were more strongly associated with Blacks. Subsequent studies using priming methods show similar empirical findings, supporting the premise that prejudicial social behavior can be activated in the absence of any conscious involvement or intervention (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996; Devine, 1989).

These recent findings also suggest that the discrepant results between explicit and implicit attitudes appear because explicit attitudes, assessed by self-report measures, may be more susceptible to self-presentational bias than implicit attitudes assessed by implicit measures. Kim (2000) tested whether White and Asian participants could voluntarily suppress the tendency to appear pro-White on an implicit racial attitude measure of Whites and Blacks. The results showed that participants could not effectively fake on an implicit measure of attitudes even under
instructions to give responses masking their pro-White attitude on the implicit measure. Even when self-presentation does not threaten the validity of the data, subtle forms of stereotypes and prejudice may be expressed unconsciously without perceivers’ awareness or control (Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995; Greenwald et al., 1998; Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 1997).

STUDY 1

Study 1 examined explicit and implicit attitudes of South Koreans and North Korean defectors toward South and North Korea. We expected that South Koreans would make consistently stronger positive evaluations of South Korea than of North Korea on both explicit and implicit measures. In contrast, North Korean defectors would show dissociated responses on the two measures: a preference for South Korea on the explicit measure, but stronger positive evaluations of the North on the implicit measure. These predictions were made for North Korean defectors because implicit attitude is not easily changed and continues to exist without awareness, whereas explicit attitude change may take place easily (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Serger, 1994).

METHODS

Participants

South Koreans. In the fall of 1997 and the spring of 1998, a total of 80 South Korean college students (36 men and 44 women) participated in the study. Forty students participated in the study for optional credit in an introductory biology class at Chonnam National University, Gwang-Ju, and another 40 students volunteered for the study in Seoul, South Korea. The age of the participants ranged from 18 to 34 years old ($Mdn = 22$ years old).

North Koreans. In the summer of 1998, 40 North Korean defectors (25 men and 15 women) were recruited through the North Korean subject pool of the Korean National Reconciliation Committee of the Korean Catholic Archdiocese, Seoul, South Korea. The age of the participants ranged from 19 to 50 years old ($Mdn = 25$). All participants were born and raised in North Korea for their entire life until defection. The North Koreans’ duration of residency in South Korea varied from 15 to 52 months ($Mdn = 22$). The participants received a $12$ telephone calling card as a gift for their voluntary participation. Only North Korean defectors who had obtained South Korean citizenship participated in the study. North Korean defectors are
awarded South Korean citizenship when they are released to South Korean society from a special post-defection camp governed by the South Korean government. Because of governmentally restricted access to North Korean defectors in the camp, it was not possible to conduct the study with them prior to their release into South Korean society.

Procedure

Special temporary laboratories were set up in five different locations of North Korean defectors’ major residential areas to make participation more convenient. For the five North Korean defectors who expressed reluctance to come to the temporary laboratory, the data were collected in their residences. An effort was made to create a test-taking environment as similar to the laboratory as possible for these latter participants.

Explicit measures. Participants first completed two attitude measures using the feeling thermometer and semantic differential formats. On the feeling thermometer, participants were asked to put a mark on four pictures of a thermometer that were labeled at bottom, middle, and top with 0 degrees (cold, or unfavorable), 50 degrees (neutral), and 99 degrees (warm, or favorable). The marks were to indicate the warmth (i.e., positiveness) of their feelings toward South Korea and North Korea (Robinson, 1974). The measure was scored by the rating of South Korea minus the rating of North Korea, a positive score indicating a more favorable attitude toward South Korea and a negative score a more favorable attitude toward the North. The score had a potential range of –99 to 99. Next, participants completed a set of five semantic differential items for each of the two object categories (i.e., South Korea and North Korea). Participants used five 7-point bipolar adjective scales (Beautiful/Ugly, Good/Bad, Pleasant/Unpleasant, Honest/Dishonest, Nice/Awful) to indicate their evaluations of each of the two attitude objects. The difference between participants’ average ratings of North and South Korea had a potential range of –6 (maximum score for North Korea preference) and 6 (maximum score for South Korea preference). Participants also responded to four 7-point bipolar adjective scales (Beautiful/Ugly, Good/Bad, Pleasant/Unpleasant, Happy/Unhappy) to indicate attitude toward “Unification of Korea.” The measure had a potential range of –3 to 3, a positive score indicating a favorable attitude toward Korean unification and negative an unfavorable attitude.

To assure participants that these questionnaire responses would be anonymous, participants completed the questionnaires in a private room and were instructed to place their completed questionnaires in a covered box located in the room.
Implicit measure: Implicit Association Test (IAT). After completing the self-report measures, each participant completed the Korean-translated version (Kim, 1997) of the implicit measure, the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald et al., 1998). The IAT is a latency-based indirect measure that is designed to assess strength of automatic associations between concepts. For example, Greenwald et al. reported that participants in the IAT responded more rapidly when flower and pleasant share a response than when insect and pleasant do, indicating that the flower–pleasant association is stronger than the insect–pleasant association. They also examined the implicit racial attitudes of White college students toward Whites and Blacks using the IAT. The study showed that White participants performed the task more easily and quickly when White was associated with pleasant than when Black was associated with pleasant. The same pattern of in-group positive association was replicated in a study of implicit attitudes of Korean-Americans and Japanese-Americans toward Korean and Japanese ethnic groups. In a study evaluating the theoretical and predictive validity of implicit measures, Kim, Sarason, and Sarason (2000) found that the degree of Korean-American college students’ implicit positive attitudes toward Koreans, as opposed to Americans, was positively correlated with a self-report measure of psychological distress, but a corresponding explicit self-report measure did not show the same pattern. Furthermore, implicit ethnic attitude and identity measures had statistically significant correlations with the degree to which Korean-American students held traditional cultural values, but explicit ethnic attitude and identity measures did not. That is, Korean-American young adults with more traditional cultural values show stronger Korean self-identity and positive attitudes toward the Korean ethnic group implicitly, but not explicitly.

Figure 1 illustrates the sequence of tasks that constituted the national attitude IAT measure of South Korea versus North Korea used in this study. The IAT starts by introducing participants to the four categories used in the task: North Korea, South Korea, pleasant, and unpleasant. Following the usual IAT procedure, participants were asked to sort stimuli representing four concepts into just two categories—each including two of the four concepts (steps 3 and 5). The IAT as a measure of association strength depends on the assumption that, when the two concepts that share a response are strongly associated, the sorting task is considerably easier than when the two concepts are either weakly associated or bipolar-opposed. For instance, if the participant responded more rapidly when South Korea and pleasant shared a response than when North Korea and pleasant were combined, this indicates that the South Korea–pleasant association is stronger than the North Korea–pleasant association.

Design of the implicit measures. In the IAT tasks, participants were instructed to “respond rapidly in categorizing each stimulus, but don’t respond so fast
that you make many errors. (Occasional errors are okay.)” Half of the participants started with the grouping of South Korea + pleasant versus North Korea + unpleasant first and the other half with the grouping of South Korea + unpleasant versus North Korea + pleasant first. Participants were instructed to classify stimulus names into the categories (pleasant, unpleasant, South Korea, and North Korea) for a 30-trial practice block, followed by a 40-trial data collection block for the two combined tasks (steps 3 and 5 in Fig. 1) along with 30 trials of the single categorization blocks (steps 1, 2 and 4). The stimuli alternately came from one category pair (e.g., pleasant vs. unpleasant) or the other (e.g., South Korea vs. North Korea). In keeping with the suggestions of Fazio et al. (1986), these items were carefully selected for their high frequency from a list of regional names of South and North Korea for which both South and North Korean participants indicated equal familiarity. These items are listed in Appendix. On each trial, incorrect classifications were followed by error feedback (the word ERROR) for 200 ms, and the stimulus item remained visible until the correct response was made, after which the next item appeared following a 150 ms delay (inter-trial interval).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sequence</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Task description</td>
<td>Initial target-concept discrimination</td>
<td>Associated attribute discrimination</td>
<td>Initial combined task</td>
<td>Reversed target-concept discrimination</td>
<td>Reversed combined task</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Task instructions</td>
<td>• NORTH KOREA SOUTH KOREA</td>
<td>• Pleasant • Unpleasant</td>
<td>• NORTH KOREA Pleasant SOUTH KOREA Unpleasant</td>
<td>• NORTH KOREA SOUTH KOREA</td>
<td>• NORTH KOREA Pleasant SOUTH KOREA Unpleasant</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sample stimuli</td>
<td>• SEOUL • PYUNGYANG PUSAN CHEUDO • JAKANGDO • HAMHUNG INCHON</td>
<td>• kindness murder agony joy happiness danger peace</td>
<td>• JAKANGDO murder joy SEOUL HAMHUNG PUSAN peace</td>
<td>• SEOUL HAMHUNG INCHON CHEUDO JAKANGDO SHINUJJU PUSAN</td>
<td>• SEOUL murder joy PUSAN HAMHUNG agony happiness</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FIGURE 1. Schematic description and illustration of the Implicit Association Test (IAT). The IAT procedure in the present experiment involved a series of five discrimination tasks (numbered columns). A pair of target concepts and attribute dimensions are introduced in the first two steps. Categories for each of these discriminations are assigned to a left or right response, indicated by the black dot in the third row. These are combined in the third step and then recombined in the fifth step, after reversing response assignments (in the fourth step) for the target–concept discrimination. The illustration uses stimuli for the specific tasks for one of the task-order conditions of Study 1, with correct responses indicated as dots (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998).
Apparatus

The IAT was administered on PC-type (80586 processor) desktop computers, each located in a room furnished with a table and chair. Participants viewed the display monitor from a distance of about 65 cm and gave responses with either left forefinger (using the A key) or right forefinger (using the 5 key on the right-side numeric keypad).

RESULTS

Explicit Measures

Self-report feeling thermometer and semantic differential measures of attitude toward South Korea and North Korea were collected prior to the IAT task. As expected, both South Korean and North Korean defector participants indicated more favorable evaluations toward South Korea than toward North Korea (see Table 1). Both groups significantly preferred South Korea to North Korea on both the feeling thermometer and the semantic differential measures, $t(79) = 9.82, p = 10^{-16}$ and $t(79) = 11.25, p = 10^{-17}$ for South Koreans, and $t(39) = 4.74, p = 10^{-4}$ and $t(39) = 6.32, p = 10^{-6}$ for North Korean defectors respectively. Analysis for the two-way interaction (group × gender) was not statistically significant, $F(1, 116) = .40, p = .53$ for the feeling thermometer and $F(1, 116) = 2.00, p = .16$ for the semantic differential. The explicit measure that assessed attitude toward Korean unification showed that both Koreans demonstrated a significantly favorable attitude toward Korean

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>South Koreans M</th>
<th>North Defectors M</th>
<th>Pooled SD</th>
<th>$d^*$</th>
<th>$t(118)$</th>
<th>$p$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feeling thermometer</td>
<td>18.30</td>
<td>21.40</td>
<td>21.30</td>
<td>.15</td>
<td>–.80</td>
<td>.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semantic differential</td>
<td>1.40</td>
<td>1.96</td>
<td>1.50</td>
<td>.36</td>
<td>–1.90</td>
<td>.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAT (Latency)</td>
<td>301.00</td>
<td>–105.00</td>
<td>177.50</td>
<td>2.30</td>
<td>11.00</td>
<td>10^{-18}</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAT (Log Latency)</td>
<td>.33</td>
<td>–.11</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>2.80</td>
<td>14.70</td>
<td>10^{-18}</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. All difference measures were scored so that positive differences indicate preference for the South relative to the North. The thermometer range was –99 to +99 and the semantic differential was –6 to +6. IAT = Implicit Association Test.

The effect size measure $d$ is computed by dividing the South minus the North mean difference by the pooled standard deviation. Conventional small, medium, and large values for $d$ are .2, .5, and .8, respectively.
Implicit National Attitude

**Preliminary treatment of data.** Consistent with the methods introduced by Greenwald et al. (1998), all trials with latencies greater than 3,000 ms were recoded to 3,000 ms, and all trials with latencies less than 300 ms were recoded to 300 ms. Then, to reduce the skew associated with response-latency data, participants’ response latencies were log-transformed. In addition, the first two trials of each block were dropped because of their typically lengthened latencies.

The IAT effect was calculated as the mean performance for the \((\text{North Korea} + \text{pleasant} \text{ and South Korea} + \text{unpleasant})\) task minus that for the \((\text{North Korea} + \text{unpleasant} \text{ and South Korea} + \text{pleasant})\) task and was used as a dependent measure. A positive IAT effect indicates more positive automatic association with South Korea than with North Korea.

Table 1 reports mean IAT effects of both South and North Koreans. The data indicate that South Koreans responded significantly faster for the \(\text{South Korea} + \text{pleasant}\) combination than for the \(\text{North Korea} + \text{pleasant}\) combination, indicating more positive automatic evaluation associated with the South than the North, \(t(79) = 20.9, p = 10^{-17}\), two-tailed. In contrast, North Koreans showed significantly faster responses for the \(\text{North Korea} + \text{pleasant}\) combination than for the \(\text{South Korea} + \text{pleasant}\) combination, indicating more positive automatic evaluation associated with the North than the South, \(t(39) = –3.98, p = .0003, \text{two-tailed}\). The difference in the IAT effects between the two groups was statistically significant.

**Gender Difference**

Unlike the explicit measures, the analysis for two-way interaction (group \(\times\) gender) on the IAT effects showed statistical significance, \(F(1, 116) = 4.96, p = .03\). Further analyses suggested that the significant gender difference was found among North Korean defectors, \(t(38) = –2.11, p = .04, \text{but not among South Koreans, } t(78) = .49, p = .63\). North Korean men showed a significantly greater positive evaluation of the North than the South, \(t(24) = –5.7, p = 10^{-5}\), but the significance was not found in women, \(t(14) = –.7, p = .5\).

**Comparison Between Explicit and Implicit Measures**

Figure 2 provides a scatter plot that describes the explicit and the implicit national attitude measures of South Koreans and North Korean defectors in one graph. The IAT effect was used as the implicit measure on the \(y\)-axis and the semantic differential as the explicit measure on the \(x\) axis. The graph illustrates
that South Koreans showed consistent southern positivity on both measures, $r(78) = .3, p = .007$, whereas the majority of North Korean defectors indicated stronger positive association with the North than with the South on the implicit measure, but preference toward the South on the explicit semantic differential measure, $r(38) = .073, p = .66$.

**SUMMARY OF STUDY 1**

Study 1 illustrates that South Koreans displayed a consistently positive evaluation toward the South on both the explicit and the implicit measures, whereas North Korean defectors were inconsistent in their attitude responses, displaying a positive evaluation toward the South on the explicit and toward the North on the implicit measures. North Korean defectors’ dissociate responses on the explicit and implicit measures replicated previous findings of explicit and implicit dissociation observed in Whites’ racial attitudes toward Blacks in the United States (Devine, 1989; Dovidio et al., 1997; Fazio et al., 1995; Greenwald et al., 1998). The implicit measure showed a gender difference among North Korean defectors, but the explicit measures did not. North Korean men, but not women, showed a stronger preference for the North than the South on the implicit mea-

![Figure 2](image-url)
sure, with the opposite result on the explicit measures. Both South Koreans and North Korean defectors indicated an explicit wish for the unification of Korea, but there exists a strong division in their implicit attitude toward the South and the North.

STUDY 2

Study 2 was designed to investigate explicit and implicit national self-identity of South Koreans and North Korean defectors. Participants responded to the IAT that employed self and other items (instead of pleasant and unpleasant) to provide a measure of implicit identity strength toward the South and North Korean nation. We predicted that North Korean defectors would show dissociate responses on implicit and explicit measures because acquisition of a new identity (i.e., South Korean citizenship) does not necessarily mean a change in implicit identity, which often reflects a long-lasting effect of the previous identification a person has held for a long period of time. However explicit, conscious identity may easily be changed because it often reflects the normative demands and acceptance of one’s current status (in this case, North Korean defectors gaining South Korean citizenship).

METHODS

Participants

**South Koreans.** A new sample of 40 South Korean college students (18 men and 22 women) participated in the study at Catholic University and Seokyung University in Seoul, South Korea, in the summer of 1998. These participants were recruited in response to a request for volunteers. The age of the participants ranged from 19 to 36 years old ($Mdn = 25$).

**North Koreans.** The same 40 North Korean defectors who participated in Study 1 also took part in Study 2. For North Korean defectors, the two IATs (i.e., national attitude in Study 1 and self-identity) were collected at the same time. The order of the IATs was counterbalanced to rule out a potential order effect. That is, half the participants started with national attitude first and the other half with national self-identity first. For each of these groups, half the participants started with the grouping of (North Korea + unpleasant or other and South Korea + pleasant or self) first and the other half with the grouping of (North Korea + pleasant or self and South Korea + unpleasant or other) first.
Materials and Procedure

As in Study 1, participants completed questionnaires in a private room and were instructed to place their completed questionnaires in a covered box located in the room. Participants first responded to a self-report measure of national self-identity in which they were asked to indicate “how strongly you associate yourself with either North Korea or South Korea.” One 7-point bipolar scale was used to indicate the strength of self-association with either South Korea or North Korea. The scale ranged from −3 (identity with the North), through 0 (neutral identity), to +3 (identity with the South).

After completing the questionnaire, participants took part in the implicit computer measure. Except for the replacement of pleasant and unpleasant categories with self and other in the IAT, the overall procedure in Study 2 was identical to the IAT procedure used in Study 1. The same 30-trial single and combined practice blocks, followed by a 40-trial data collection block for the two combined tasks, were used as in Study 1. On each trial, incorrect classifications were followed by error feedback (the word ERROR) for 200 ms., and the stimulus item remained visible until the correct response was made, after which the next item appeared following a 150 ms delay (inter-trial interval). Four self-meaning words and four other-meaning words were used for the national self-identity IAT (see Appendix).

RESULTS

Explicit Measure

The self-report measure of national self-identity was collected prior to the IAT tasks. Our expectation was that South Koreans would indicate stronger self-association with South Korea, whereas North Korean defectors would show a neutral or stronger self-association with South Korea than with North Korea. The results (see Table 2) showed that South Korean participants indicated stronger self-association with South Korea, whereas North Koreans on average showed a neutral or statistically non-significant self-association with the North ($d = .2$). Further analysis for the two-way interaction (group × gender) was not statistically significant, $F(1, 76) = .15, p = .7$.

Implicit National Identity

The procedure for the treatment of latency data for the IAT was the same as in Study 1. The IAT effect was calculated as the mean performance for the (North Korea + self and South Korea + other) task minus that for the (North Korea + other and
South Korea + self task. A positive IAT effect indicates stronger association of self with the South than with the North.

Table 2 describes the mean IAT effects of both South Koreans and North Korean defectors. South Koreans showed significantly faster responses for the South Korea + self combination than for the North Korea + self combination. In contrast, North Korean participants responded significantly faster for the North Korea + self combination than for the South Korea + Self combination. The mean difference of the IAT effects between the two groups was statistically significant $t(78) = 8.2, p = 10^{-12}$, two-tailed.

**Gender Difference**

A two-way interaction analysis for group by gender on the IAT effect showed a marginally significant result, $F(1, 76) = 2.86, p = .09$. Further analyses suggested that a marginally significant gender difference was found among North Korean defectors, $t(38) = –2, p = .058$, but not among South Koreans, $t(38) = .23, p = .82$. Whereas the total group of North Koreans showed a significantly greater association of self with the North than with the South, $t(24) = –3.87, p = .001$, the significance was not found in women, $t(14) = –1.4, p = .18$. 

---

**TABLE 2**

Summary Statistics for Explicit and Implicit Measures of National Self-Identity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Explicit Measure</th>
<th>Implicit Measure (IAT)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>South Koreans</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>2.30</td>
<td>.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>.85</td>
<td>.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$d^a$</td>
<td>2.70</td>
<td>1.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$t(39)$</td>
<td>17.00</td>
<td>8.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$p$</td>
<td>$10^{-16}$</td>
<td>$10^{-11}$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>North Korean defectors</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M</td>
<td>–.35</td>
<td>–.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SD</td>
<td>1.80</td>
<td>.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$d^a$</td>
<td>.20</td>
<td>.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$t(39)$</td>
<td>–1.25</td>
<td>–3.95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$p$</td>
<td>.22</td>
<td>$10^{-3}$</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note.* Implicit Association Test (IAT) measures were based on natural logarithm transformations. The explicit self-identity measure was scored from $–3$ to $+3$ so that a negative score indicates stronger self-association of the self to the North and positive to the South.

*The effect size measure $d$ is computed by dividing the mean score by the standard deviation. Conventional small, medium, and large values for $d$ are .2, .5, and .8, respectively.*
Comparison Between Implicit and Explicit Measures

Figure 3 describes the explicit and the implicit measures of national self-identity of South Koreans and North Korean defectors in one graph as in Study 1. The graph illustrates that South Koreans made stronger associations of self with South Korea uniformly on both explicit and implicit measures, although the relation was not statistically significant, \( r(38) = .21, p = .21 \). On the contrary, North Korean defectors demonstrated stronger associations of self with North Korea on the implicit measure, but on average expressed a neutral national self-identity (almost halfway between the South and the North) on the explicit self-report measure, \( r(38) = .09, p = .6 \).

SUMMARY OF STUDY 2

As expected, South Koreans showed consistently stronger association of self with South Korea both explicitly and implicitly. However, North Korean defectors revealed noticeable inconsistency in both measures. North Korean defectors indicated a neutral identity on the explicit measure, presumably reflecting their dual affiliation with both South and North Korea simultaneously. However, the implicit
measure revealed strong self-association with the North, which suggests that their implicit old identity continues to exist and is not easily changed even after their explicit new identity, including South Korean citizenship, has been established.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

This study makes an important first step for psychosocial research on Korean unification, particularly in the domain of prejudicial attitudes, which, although difficult to test, have long been assumed to exist between South and North Koreans. The study also demonstrates cross-cultural/ecological validity of implicit cognition as an observable construct dissociated from explicit cognition in a new context. The participants come from a racially homogeneous divided nation, where the past 50 years of national separation and differences in political ideology have created antagonism. North Korean defectors showed (a) more positive evaluation of the South than of the North on the explicit self-report measures, but more favorable evaluation of the North on the implicit measure and (b) North–South neutrality on the explicit measure of national identity but to stronger association of self with the North than with the South on the implicit measure. In contrast, South Koreans showed consistent positive attitudes and identity with the South on both implicit and explicit measures.

Explicit and Implicit Dissociation

Validity of a measure can be established when different operations representing the same underlying theoretical construct produce essentially the same results, which defines convergent validity of a measure (as in Gerald & Mathewson, 1966). Convergent validity of an implicit measure can be established if it is highly correlated with explicit measures of the same variable. On the other hand, convergent validity cannot be established if those measures are not correlated (Campbell & Fiske, 1959). With respect to the convergent validity of the implicit attitude measure (IAT), Study 1 demonstrated a theoretically expected correlation of South Koreans’ implicit attitudes with explicit self-report measures: $r(78) = .3, p = .007$ with the semantic differential measure, and $r(78) = .3, p = .01$ with the feeling thermometer, supporting a similar view that South Koreans have toward the North and the South.

On the other hand, the two studies demonstrated a clear dissociation between implicit and explicit measures for North Korean defectors. Table 3 shows a correlation of implicit and explicit measures of national attitude and self-identity among North Korean defectors. On average using $r$ to $z$ conversion, the three explicit measures (and the two IAT measures) of national attitude and identity were better cor-
related with each other (average $r = .34$ for explicit measures and $r = .56$ for implicit IAT measures) than the explicit measures were with the IAT measures of the same constructs (average $r = .01$). That is, there was greater variation using the same method to measure different constructs (method effect) than variation among the same constructs using different methods of measurement (trait effect). This observation from North Korean defectors strongly suggests a divergence of the constructs represented by the implicit versus the explicit psychological measures (Campbell & Fiske, 1959; Greenwald et al., 1998; Kim et al., 2000).

Two interpretations may be drawn from North Korean defectors’ dissociate responses on the implicit and explicit self-report measures. First, North Korean defectors’ preference for the South on the explicit measures may reflect socially desirable responses because they live in South Korea where they are expected to be favorable to South Korea. However, North Korean participants in the study defected to South Korea with significant sacrifices, including potential loss of their own lives if caught, and significant penalties and potential loss of life for their family members left in the North. These facts suggest that it is less likely that North Korean defectors’ preference for the South on the explicit measure is a function of social desirability, but more likely anger toward the North for the sacrifices they have had to make. Therefore, interpretation of the dissociation based on socially desirable responses should be considered with great caution.

A second more compelling argument would be that North Koreans’ positive association with the North observed in the implicit measure may reflect the traces,
expressed without awareness, of past social experience and affection associated with the North, in which they spent a significant part of their lives. These effects on attitude may not always be revealed in an explicit manner because of their implicit/unconscious characteristics (Graf & Schacter, 1985; Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Serger, 1994). That is, North Korean defectors’ implicit and explicit attitude dissociation may represent two conflicting evaluative modes toward the North: (a) implicit attitudes reflecting a positively laden affective or emotional attachment to the North, as in nostalgia for a hometown, and (b) explicit attitudes reflecting a rational evaluation of the North associated with the negative experiences and memories that motivated their defection.

Gender Difference

Although the sample sizes were too small to make reliable inferences, the gender difference found in North Korean defectors may suggest important consideration for future study. In a similar vein, Boski (1991) investigated national identity among Polish immigrants in Canada. The study showed that second generation women exhibited a higher level of Canadian identity than Polish identity, but that second generation men showed a very low degree of Canadian identity. Moreover, the same results were replicated in Boski’s (1992) study of Polish immigrants in the United States: female Polish-Americans showed a higher level of American identity than men, whereas men scored higher in Polish identity measures. These results suggest that gender differences may exist in the developmental acculturation process of national identity and national attitudes. This issue requires clarification in future studies.

Limitations of the Study

Despite the important findings of this study, several factors may nevertheless limit the interpretation of these findings. First, we cannot say for sure that the implicit attitude data from North Korean defectors truly represent what North Koreans living in the North feel toward South Korea until we collect data from North Koreans in the North. However, given that North Koreans who voluntarily defected to the South still show stronger implicit preferences for North Korea over South Korea, it is our speculation that non-defecting North Koreans would have developed even greater prejudice toward South Korea (Grinker, 1998; Jung, 1996; Shim, 1995).

Second, this study examined data from South and North Korean groups with relatively different backgrounds (e.g., age and education). However, this limitation cannot be easily overcome at present due to the limited access to and availability of North Korean defectors in South Korea. Third, although theoretically
expected consistent South Korean identity of South Koreans on both explicit and implicit measures was observed, the power to detect significant association between explicit and implicit identity measures would have been greater with larger samples. Finally, the implicit identity measure used a difference score as a dependent measure, whereas the explicit self-report identity measure used a unidirectional linear bipolar structure (Andujo, 1988; Makabe, 1979; Simic, 1987; Ullah, 1985). The explicit national identity measure was conceptualized as forming a continuum from one strong national tie (South Korea) at one extreme, to the other strong national tie (North Korea) at the other extreme. On the other hand, the difference score used in the implicit identity measure addressed the orthogonal/independent nature of identification: Identification with one nation is independent of identification with another (Oetting & Beauvais, 1990). Future research is necessary to determine whether these differences may have an impact on these findings.

CONCLUSION

For German unification, Helmut Kohl’s government developed a thorough political and economic plan. However, the psychosocial conflicts that occurred between the former East and West German citizens after German unification were not expected and were not adequately prepared for (Grinker, 1998). With the belated realization of the serious impact of social and cultural issues on the unified Germany, the German government initiated a program of socio-cultural and psychological research only two years after the unification (German Embassy of Korea, 1992). The German experience suggests that political, ideological, and economic remedies are not, in themselves, adequate solutions leading to a successful outcome of the ultimate wish of Korean unification for both North and South Koreans. We have no doubt that the two Koreas have a strong wish for Korean unification. But our findings demonstrate the existence of a noticeable division in implicit attitudes toward the North and the South for South Koreans and North Koreans who even voluntarily defected to South Korea. These results may imply a long journey for both Koreans to the ultimate unification of Korea, namely the psychosocial unification of its people.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This research was supported by a Chester Fritz Research Grant from the University of Washington Graduate School, awarded to the first author, and a grant from the Korean Reconciliation Committee, the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Seoul, to the second author. We are indebted to Barbara Sarason and a number of anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments on early drafts of this article. We are very
grateful to The Most Reverend Kang, U-Il, Father Han, Jung-Kwan, The Reverend Jung, Kwang-Ung, and Sister Lee, Sun-Jung for their support and encouragement. Our special appreciation goes to the North Korean defectors who participated in the study.

REFERENCES


**APPENDIX**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>남한 (South Korea)</th>
<th>북한 (North Korea)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>서울 (Seoul)</td>
<td>평안도 (Pyungan-do)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>부산 (Pusan)</td>
<td>함경도 (Hamkyung-do)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>인천 (Inchon)</td>
<td>함흥 (Hamhung)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>충청도 (Chungchong-do)</td>
<td>신의주 (Shinuiju)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>전라도 (Cholla-do)</td>
<td>평양 (Pyongyang)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>경상도 (Kyongsang-do)</td>
<td>자강도 (Jakang-do)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>제주도 (Cheju-do)</td>
<td>원산 (Wonsan)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>좋다 (Pleasant)</th>
<th>싶다 (Unpleasant)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>친절 (kindness)</td>
<td>죽음 (death)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>축복 (blessing)</td>
<td>가난 (poverty)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>평화 (peace)</td>
<td>악마 (demon)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>자유 (freedom)</td>
<td>지옥 (hell)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>기쁨 (joy)</td>
<td>살인 (murder)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>행복 (happiness)</td>
<td>고통 (agony)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>행운 (good luck)</td>
<td>위험 (danger)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>자신 (Self)</th>
<th>타인 (Other)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>자신 (Self)</td>
<td>타인 (Other)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>나는 (I)</td>
<td>그들 (They)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>나를 (Me)</td>
<td>그 사람 (He)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>나의 (My)</td>
<td>그들의 (Their)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>